Mind, Brain, and Free Will by Richard Swinburne

By Richard Swinburne

Mind, mind, and loose Will offers a robust new case for substance dualism (the concept that people encompass parts--body and soul) and for libertarian unfastened will (that people have a few freedom to select from possible choices, independently of the reasons which impact them). Richard Swinburne argues that solutions to questions about brain, physique, and unfastened will rely crucially at the solutions to extra common philosophical questions. He starts by way of interpreting the standards for one occasion being just like one other, one substance being almost like one other, and a scenario being metaphysically attainable; after which is going directly to examine the factors for a trust approximately those concerns being justified. natural psychological occasions (including awake occasions) are distinctive from actual occasions and have interaction with them. Swinburne claims that no end result from neuroscience or the other technology may perhaps convey that interplay doesn't happen; and illustrates this declare by way of exhibiting that fresh medical paintings (such as Libet's experiments) has no tendency no matter what to teach that our intentions don't reason mind occasions. He is going directly to argue for agent causation, and claims that--to communicate precisely--it is we, and never our intentions, that reason our mind occasions. it really is metaphysically attainable that every folks may perhaps gather a brand new mind or live on with no mind; and so we're primarily souls. mind occasions and wakeful occasions are so varied from one another that it's going to now not be attainable to set up a systematic idea which might expect what every one people might do in occasions of ethical clash. for that reason given a vital epistemological precept (the precept of Credulity) we should always think that issues are as they appear to be: that we make offerings independently of the motives which impact us. in response to Swinburne's lucid and impressive account, it follows that we're morally liable for our actions.

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6. I claim in the text that we need more than that to distinguish between powers. John Hawthorne shows this by pointing out that there can be a world in which two properties have exactly the same effects when instantiated alone, but a different effect when co-instantiated from the effect which either would have separately. The two properties must therefore be different from each other, but one cannot tell by its effects which is which. See his ‘Causal Structuralism’ republished in his Metaphysical Essays, Oxford University Press, 2006, p.

Suppose I have a car which I turn into a boat. I can think of cars as essentially cars. In that case one substance (a car) has ceased to exist and the matter of which it was made has been used to make a different substance (a boat). Or I can think of cars as essentially motor vehicles, in which case my car has continued to exist but with different (non-essential) properties (being a boat instead of a car). All three substances exist (whether we think of them in the one way or the other way)—the car which is essentially a car, the boat which is essentially a boat, and the motor vehicle which is essentially a motor vehicle.

I cannot see any justification for operating with a narrower concept of ‘substance’. Van Inwagen considers that mereological compounds, artefacts, and gerrymandered objects do not exist, and so of course they cannot be substances. 32 M I N D, B R A I N , A N D F R E E W I L L monadic properties and relations to other particles, that might suffice (if we forget for the present about obvious problems to be discussed subsequently arising from substances having mental properties). g. fundamental particles) and the way those parts are arranged.

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